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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
EFFECTS ON THE DETERMINANTS OF PRIVATE INVESMTENT: THE EFFECTS
OF RELATIVE PRICE UNCERTAINTY AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY
by
Monica Escaleras
Florida International University, 2003
Miami, Florida
Professor Dimitrios Thomakos, Major Professor
The objective of this study was to provide empirical evidence on the effects of
relative price uncertainty and political instability on private investment. My effort is
expressed in a single-equation model using macroeconomic and socio-political data from
eight Latin American countries for the period 1970-1996. Relative price uncertainty is
measured by the implied volatility of the exchange rate and political instability is
measured by using indicators of social unrest and political violence.
I found that, after controlling for other variables, relative price uncertainty and
political instability are negatively associated with private investment. Macroeconomic
and political stability are key ingredients for the achievement of a strong investment
response. This highlights the need to develop the state and build a civil society in which
citizens can participate in decision-making and express consent without generating social
turmoil. At the same time the government needs to implement structural policies along
with relative price adjustments to eliminate excess volatility in price movements in order
to provide a stable environment for investment.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The objective of this chapter is to provide an overview of 1) the current situation
and some economic problems Latin American countries have been facing, 2) the factors
that determine private investment, and 3) the objectives of this research.
Current Situation
Almost two decades ago, the debt crisis set off a period of macroeconomic
instability and lack of external financing that led to a drastic decline in capital formation
in developing countries. This trend endangers the sustainability of stabilization and
reform programs. For adjustment policies to be followed by growth a robust response by
investment is required, particularly by the private sector, which is expected to play a key
role in market-oriented reforms. However, for that investment response to materialize,
and for the private sector to engage in intrinsically irreversible investment decisions, it
needs to perceive adjustment as sustainable. Lack of confidence in the permanence of a
policy leads to macroeconomic instability and creates uncertainty among investors.
Therefore, we should expect that macroeconomic uncertainty will diminish private
investment.
Many Latin American countries have undertaken both macroeconomic and
structural changes in recent years to stimulate private investment. A casual examination
of the data shows that the response of private investment to these reforms has been, so
far, disappointing. As the continued predominance of capital flight demonstrates, few of
these countries have managed to establish an "acceptable investment climate." One
important reason is the high degree of uncertainty regarding future economic policies.
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High-inflation countries like Argentina or Brazil have undergone a large number of failed
stabilization programs. Even in a country like Mexico, which has (since 1983)
maintained a consistent policy stance, there have been sharp unpredicted changes in
certain areas of policy like trade and exchange rate policies.
The impact of macroeconomic uncertainty and political instability on private
investment, a topic of obvious concern for policy makers, has attracted considerable
interest in the theoretical as well as empirical literature. From the theoretical perspective,
analytical work has pointed out a number of different channels through which
macroeconomic uncertainty can impact investment, under various assumptions about risk
aversion, adjustment costs to investment and other factors (see Caballero, 1991 and Abel
and Eberly, 1994). Depending on the underlying assumptions, some approaches predict a
positive relationship, while others predict a negative one.
Empirical studies on macroeconomic uncertainty and investment are less
abundant, and mostly confined to single-country studies focusing on the U.S. and U.K.
Overall, they are not conclusive in their assessment of the impact of macroeconomic
uncertainty, although the majority does find a negative association between the two
variables. In most cases, however, these studies use naive measures of sample variability
rather than uncertainty, often ignore important investment determinants, and/or fail to
account for the simultaneity between investment and its determinants.
The prevalence of uncertainty and instability can be a serious obstacle to fixed
investment decisions. Uncertainty can become a powerful investment deterrent, a
conclusion that seems to be supported by empirical evidence and has important policy
implications.
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Trends in Fixed Private Investment and Related Indicators in Latin America
Table 1.1 provides some information regarding the trend of GDP growth, inflation
and private investment from 1970 to 1999 for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.
In the last three decades Latin erica has experienced periods of high inflation,
volatility in economic growth and macroeconomic instability. In addition, neither
economic reforms nor the large-scale return of capital flows to Latin America that began
in the late 1980s has led to a significant improvement in private investment performance.
Incentives to invest continue to be weak. In some countries, progress towards the
achievement of macroeconomic stability has been slow (Brazil and Venezuela), and in
others, it still viewed as fragile (Argentina and Peru). In Argentina, Colombia, Mexico
and Peru the appreciation of the real exchange rate, coupled with widespread trade
liberalization and the dismantling of export incentives has discouraged investment in the
export-oriented sector. In addition, in most countries, credit conditions remain tight
partly in order to fight inflation and the scarcity of credit to the private sector is having a
dampening effect on private investment.
Macroeconomic Determinants of Private Investment in Latin America
There is a great deal of literature on the determinants of private investment in
developing countries. A paper by Serven and Solimano (1993) summarizes the literature
and empirical findings regarding the determinants of private investment in developing
countries. They conclude that theoretical considerations and empirical findings suggest
that the variables affecting private investment that are relevant for developing countries
are the rate of economic growth, the interest rate, the real exchange rate, and
macroeconomic stability (as proxied by either the variability of the exchange rate or the
rate of inflation).
The rate of growth of output is normally included in empirical research of the
determinants of investment in order to capture the accelerator effect. It usually enters
investment equations in lagged form so as to avoid simultaneity problems.
The real interest rate is also considered an important determinant of private
investment. However, there are competing views about the effect of real interest rate on
private investment. A high level of real interest rates raises the real cost of capital, and
therefore dampens the level of private investment. But there is another side. Poorly
developed financial markets in these countries, and inadequate access to foreign
financing for most private projects, implies that private investment is constrained largely
by domestic savings. These, in theory, are expected to respond positively to higher real
interest rates. Therefore, private investment could be positively related to real interest
rates in developing countries (Green and Villanueva, 1990).
The level of the real exchange rate has also been considered to be an
important determinant of investment. A real devaluation increases the replacement cost
of capital goods and should therefore discourage investment. However, real exchange
rate depreciation also changes the relative profitability of tradables and non-tradables in
favor of the former. In small open economies, it is easier to sustain long waves of
investment and growth when the engine is the export sector (which does not face demand
limits to growth) than when investment is concentrated in non-tradables or importables.
Sustained growth in output and investment in exportables could pull up investment in
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non-tradables, even though the relative profitability of the latter sector would initially
decline (Agosin, 1995).
Finally, it is important to take into account the fact that investment is an
irreversible commitment of resources in exchange for a highly uncertain future stream of
earnings (Pyndick, 1993; Caballero, 1993). It is usually impossible to recoup even a
portion of the investment when future incomes turn out to be smaller than ex ante
expectations. Therefore, the environment in which investment decisions take place must
have a minimum of predictability as to future prices and demand conditions, which are
inversely related to macroeconomic stability. Widely used proxies for macroeconomic
instability are the rate of inflation, its variance and the coefficient of variation of the real
exchange rate.
From a policy perspective the credibility of policy reforms is an important source
of uncertainty. Governments can reverse adjustment policies, but investors cannot undo
decisions about fixed capital. In such conditions the value of waiting arises from the
losses that investors would incur if the policies were reversed in the future.
According to Seven and Solimano (1993) any given set of policies will affect
investment depending on the level of public confidence. Stabilization may entail m arked
social and economic costs if the government's credibility is low, because the investment
response will be too low to offset the deflationary bias of demand constraint. Thus a
deep recession may develop before investors are persuaded that the government will
maintain the adjustment measures. This skepticism is particularly relevant in economies
with a history of frequent policy swings or failed stabilization attempts: two features
shared by many Latin American countries.
Objective
The objective of this research is to examine the effect of relative price uncertainty,
political instability and attempts of policy reversal on private investment. Relative price
uncertainty makes price signals less informative about the relative profitability of
investment across sectors, and will likely hamper the investment decision. In addition,
social unrest disrupts market activities and can affect investment for reasons different
than the uncertainty associated with high expected investment turnover. fact, mass
violence, civil wars, political disorder and physical threats to workers and entrepreneurs
engaged in productive activities can have direct effects on productivity and therefore on
the rate of return on investment. Thus, political instability measured by the number of
assassinations, general strikes, guerilla warfare, major government changes, purges, riots
and revolutions is expected to have a negative effect on investment. Finally, government
policy instability is another source of discouragement for investors. Unless investors
view the adjustment as internally consistent and are convinced the government will carry
it out despite the implied social costs, the possibility of reversal will become a key
determinant of investment decisions. Therefore, attempts of policy reversal are expected
to have a negative effect on private investment.
This paper contributes to the political economy of private investment in several ways.
First, as shown in the literature review, there is a collection of studies that exclusively
analyze the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on private investment while there is
another set of studies that solely analyze the impact of political instability on private
investment. A more appropriate assessment will be to jointly examine the effect of
macroeconomic uncertainty and socio-political instability on private investment, as it is
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done in this paper. Second, for policy implications it is important to examine the impact
of macroeconomic uncertainty and political instability on private investment by
controlling for each other. Third, there are many studies examining exclusively the link
between macroeconomic uncertainty and private investment. A new contribution to the
literature is that I examine which socio-political factors affect macroeconomic
uncertainty. Fourth, there are several methods to measure political instability; some
authors have used an index while others have used individual variables that represent
political instability. A more appropriate approach will be to analyze which of these two
approaches conveys more information regarding political instability instead of choosing
a-priori a method of measurement of socio-political instability. Fifth, for policy
implications it is interesting to analyze the effect of policy reversal on private investment.
We are specifically interested in the following questions:
1) Does relative price uncertainty reduce private investment?
2) Does political instability in addition to relative price uncertainty affect private
investment? And, moreover, does relative price uncertainty remain relevant when one
controls for political instability?
3) Do attempts of policy reversal influence private investment?
I provide some evidence that relative price uncertainty and political instability are
strong discouraging factors in private investment decision. In addition, a proxy for
the possibility of policy reversal has a significant negative effect on private
investment.
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Chapter Preview
Chapter 2 provides a review of the main studies related to private investment,
uncertainty and political instability. Chapter 3 analyses the link between private
investment and relative price uncertainty, using macroeconomic data for Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. Chapter 4 examines the
effect of relative price uncertainty and political instability on aggregate private
investment, using macroeconomic and socio-political data for eight Latin American
countries.
8
Table 1.1 Summary o2f Eonoic nicators, Decade Averages (Percentages)
Country 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999
Argentina:
Log yt 2.93 -0.73 2.15
Log(it) 3.08 -3.11 7.83
Log (it/yt) 0.30 -2.24 3.55
Pt 132.94 565.69 252.91
Bolivia:
Log yt 4.23 -0.41 4.06
Log(ic) 4.24 -4.88 12.57
Pt 15.91 1383.15 10.41
Brazil:
Log yt 8.48 2.99 1.85
Log (it) -1.06 0.38 0.30
pt 354.52 843.28 19.86
Chile:
Log yt 2.48 4.40 6.49
Log (it) 1.81 7.27 5.56
pt N/A 354.52 823.44
Notes:
Log yt represents GDP growth
Log(it) represents Private Investment Growth
pt represents the inflation rate
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(con't) Table 1.1 S mry of Eomic Indicars DcdAverages (ercentags
Country 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999
Colombia:
Log yt 5.81 3.40 2.84
Log (it) 3.53 1.98 -2.73
Pt 13.31 23.47 22.46
Mexico:
Log yt 6.43 2.29 3.38
Log (it) 5.71 1.47 7.27
Pt 14.68 69.05 20.41
Peru:
Log yt 7.50 0.34 3.30
Log (it) 7.64 1.71 6.91
pt 26.51 481.32 807.90
Venezuela:
Log yt 3.97 -0.17 2.44
Log (it/yt) 6.88 -8.70 3.29
Pt 6.61 23.02 47.44
Notes:
Log yt represents GDP growth
Log(it) represents Private Investment Growth
pt represents the inflation rate
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
The objective of this chapter is to review prior research related to the
determinants of private investment. Although there are several publications dealing with
similar issues, it remains unclear what factors other than the traditional ones influence
private investment.
Articles are classified in three sections. The first sections deals with the theory of
investment decision under uncertainty, the second section summarizes the empirical
evidence of the link between uncertainty and private investment, and the third section
presents the empirical evidence of the relationship between private investment and
political instability.
Theory of Investment Decision under Uncertainty
The relationship between uncertainty and investment has been studied
theoretically. Nevertheless taken as a whole the theoretical predictions are ambiguous;
depending on their underlying assumptions, some approaches predict a positive
relationship, while others predict a negative one. Much of the theoretical work regarding
uncertainty and investment has been developed in the framework of risk-neutrality. The
impact of uncertainty in standard models of a risk-neutral firm-level decision process
basically depends on the relationship between the expected marginal revenue product of
capital and the uncertainty variable(s), typically the output price or the real wage. For
example, if the marginal revenue product of capital is a convex function of the variables
whose evolution is uncertain, then higher uncertainty raises expected profitability and,
ceteris paribus, the desired capital stock and hence investment (Gi 1961, Hartman 1972,
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1976, Abel 1983). Bar-Ilan and Strange (1992) find a similar effect in a model which
includes costly entry and exist and time-to-build. In Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) uncertain
projects are more desirable since bankruptcy limits downside risk.
The main class of models that predict a concave marginal revenue product of
capital are those with irreversible investment. Irreversibilities make returns to investment
asymmetric. If the future turns out to be worse than expected, the marginal revenue
product of capital falls, and the investor is stuck with low returns. If, on the other hand,
prospects improve, the incentive is to invest more, hence limiting the rise in the marginal
revenue product of capital. This assymetry implies that the marginal revenue product of
capital is a concave function of wages and prices. Pyndick (1982, 1988) introduces
adjustment costs, implied by the acquisition and installation of capital, emphasizing the
irreversible nature of most fixed investment projects. Therefore, investment takes place
only when expected profitability exceeds a certain threshold.
From the preceding discussion, however, it should be clear that irreversibility is
not sufficient to tum around the positive impact of uncertainty on investment that follows
from the convexity of the profit function. To reverse this result, it is necessary to bring in
additional assumptions such as imperfect competition or decreasing returns to scale (or
both). When combined with irreversibility, they make the marginal revenue product of
capital a decreasing function of the capital stock. Consequently, higher uncertainty leads
to lower investment (Caballero 1991).
According to Bertola and Caballero (1994), even if the threshold effect dominates
so that irreversibility and uncertainty reduce investment in the short run ex-ante, little can
be said of their long-run impact. Higher degrees of irreversibility and/or uncertainty
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make it more likely that firms will find themselves holding too much capital ex-post.
This "hangover effect" tends to increase the long-run capital stock above the level that
would have prevailed with a lower degree of less irreversibility or less uncertainty.
However, some inferences about the impact of uncertainty on investment can still
be drawn from these models. In particular, temporary increases in uncertainty should
reduce investment, at least in the sho run, because fewer projects will exceed the higher
investment threshold resulting from increased volatility.
The private investor incorporates into his decision-making uncertainty from two
sources: uncertainty of relative prices and uncertainty regarding the sustainability of the
present macroeconomic policy. A model by Conway (1990) is used in this paper to
explain the effect of uncertainty on private investment. Consider an economy in which
trade and financial reforms have just been introduced. These reforms will be represented
by an increase in the return to capital in the export-oriented sectors from some lower
value to a higher specific level denoted r. Let r* be the uncertain real return to capital in
the loanable funds market. r* is more volatile in the presence of financial liberalization.
Now, let's assume that r exceeds the expected uncertain real return to capital in the
loanable funds market, E(r*). Policy uncertainty will be modeled in the form of a
probability 6 that the reform will be reversed. Assumed to be constant over time, 6
measures the likelihood (per unit of time) of policy reversal. Entry costs will be
represented by c.
Capital investment is partially irreversible since there are sunk costs of entry and
exit when physical capital is committed or moved from one sector to another. This aspect
of the model, together with uncertainty, places it within the literature on hysteresis (see
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Dixit (1987), Krugman (1988) and Pindyck (1988)). The main idea of this literature is
that with costly resource reallocation, uncertainty plays an important role in decision-
making by having significant effects on behavior even without risk aversion. Also, large
enough changes in the environment can produce lasting effects on resource allocation
even when the initial changes are eventually fully reversed.
Let's consider the investment decision of an entrepreneur who has a single unit of
capital immediately after the reform. He must choose if and when to finance an
investment earning a return r per period. There are two periods, and the investor faces
three mutually exclusive options: not to invest, to wait and invest in the second period, or
to invest now. The payoffs are shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1
Payoffs to Investors Net of Opportunity Cost
(per unit of capital)
Period 1 Period 2
Opportunity cost r1 * r2*
Wait: invest later 0 6 r2* + (1- 6)(r-s) - r2*
Invest now r- c- ri * (r-t) + (1-8)r - r2 *
The opportunity cost is the real interest rate prevailing in the loanable funds
market. The investor, by waiting and investing only in the second period, can avoid the
policy instability and/or take advantage of a lower interest rate in the loanable funds
market. If the reform if reversed, then with probability 6 the return to the investor is r2*
otherwise, the investor receives a return r less the entry cost . Investment in period one
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leads to a return r in both periods. There will be the entry cost s in the first period and a
cost of policy reversal t in the second.
The following question can be addressed within this framework: will reform lead
investors to invest in the first period rather than waiting to invest in the second period or
not invest at all? The discount rate on the second period returns will be represented by p
and the question can be answered by comparing the returns of the three strategies in
Table 2.1.
Investment in period two is preferable to no investment at all if r2*< r - c; it is
assumed that this lower bound on returns on physical investment is met. Therefore,
investment in the first period is preferable to that in the second period if:
r > r +(3/(p+3))[r,* r*]+(1/(p+ 8))[& + (p+ -1)] (2.1)
The above equation illustrates the importance of the two kinds of uncertainty as they
relate to the investment decision. The first kind, the real interest rate uncertainty, is
captured in the second term on the right-hand side. The second kind, policy
sustainability, is represented by 6 throughout. The third term of the right-hand side
captures the fixed costs of investment, indicating that in equilibrium the real return on
physical investment will in general exceed the real return to capital in the loanable funds
market.
From an econometric perspective it is difficult to separate these two kinds of
uncertainty since variability in real interest rates can be strongly correlated with the
probability of the collapse of the reforns. Conway (1990) uses a simple proxy to
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represent policy reversal. Suppose the evolution of government debt over time takes the
form (as ratios of output):
d= d, +b, + (r - go )d,_, (2.2)
where d represents debt, b represents borrowing, ro is the long-run average real interest
rate and go represents the long-run growth rate of the economy. Based on development
theory it can be said that fiscal instability is a reason for the reversal of trade and
financial reform: as the governrent looks to finance budget deficits, it may seek to assert
greater control over financial markets or increase tariffs. Within this framework,
government debt becomes unstable in the steady state if the real interest rate exceeds the
growth rate of output. An indicator that looks at this relationship will provide a test of
the relative importance of policy collapse. Steady-state variables are not observed, but
there are observable real interest rates and growth rates in each period, and these could be
used to construct an indicator.
Empirical Evidence of the Impact of Uncertainty on Private Investment
The empirical literature on the relationship between uncertainty and investment is
considerably smaller than the corresponding theoretical literature. Most empirical
studies, particularly those using macroeconomic data, adopt a non-structural approach, in
which various uncertainty proxies are used instead of the conventional reduced-form
investment equations.
Conway (1990) estimates the impact of relative-price uncertainty (real exchange
rate and interest rate) and policy uncertainty on Turkey's real private investment. He
finds that relative-price uncertainty has a negative effect on the private investment
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decisions. However, the proxy used for the possibility of policy reversal has no
significant effect on the private investment.
A few studies have examined the impact of uncertainty on U.S. and U.K.
investment. Federer (1993) finds a negative effect on U.S. equipment investment, while
Price (1996) finds a likewise negative effect on U.K. manufacturing investment. In turn,
Goldberg (1993) explores the impact of real exchange rate uncertainty on U.S. industry-
level investment. She finds virtually no effect at the aggregate level, while at the
subsector level her results vary in sign and significance.
Cross-country empirical studies using aggregate data are somewhat more
abundant. Hausmann and Gavin (1995), report a negative association between an index of
macroeconomic volatility (which combines real GDP and real exchange rate volatility)
and the aggregate investment/GDP ratio, using a large sample of developing countries.
Bleaney (1996) finds that measures of volatility negatively affect growth performance in
developing countries, but do not affect aggregate investment.
Most of the cross-country empirical studies ignore the time-series variation in the
data. However, there are a few exceptions. Pindyck and Solimano (1993) test for the
effect of uncertainty on aggregate investment following the irreversibility approach.
Using panel data for industrial and developing countries, they construct proxies for the
profitability threshold, and examine its relation with the volatility of profitability itself.
They also estimate reduced-form investment regressions including the volatility of
inflation and the exchange rate. They found that the volatility of the exchange rate has a
negative effect on investment. Serven (1998) estimates a private investment equation
using panel data on a group of developing countries. He uses five measures for
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uncertainty of which only the real exchange rate has a robust adverse impact on private
investment.
Empirical Evidence of the Impact of Political Instability on Private Investment
There are numerous studies interested in the relationship between political
instability and private investment. Alesina and Perotti (1996), Barro (1991) find that
sociopolitical instability reduces investment in a sample of seventy-one countries. Their
result is consistent with Barro (1991, 1997) and Alesina, Ozler, Roubini, and Swagel
(1996) who find that political and social instability leads to a decrease in the investment
share of GDP.
A number of empirical studies have shown the relationship between democracy,
investment and economic growth. Feng (2001) examines whether democracy and other
major characteristics of political institutions have an impact on private investment in
developing countries. Pastor and Hilt (1993) and Pastor and Sung (1995) analyze the
relationship between democracy and private investment in Latin erica and they found
that democracy has a positive impact on private investment.
A collection of studies focus on uncertainties generated by changes in policies
rather than in the political system that affects investment. The impact of different forms
of uncertainty on private investment has been discussed by Serven an Solimano (1993),
Rodrik (1991), Federer (1993), Price (1996), Goldberg (1993), Bleaney (1996),
Aizenman and Marion (1993), Price (1995), Pyndick and Solimano (1993), Hausmann
and Gavin (1995), an Brunetti and Weder (1998). All of them found that policy
uncertainty has a negative effect on private investment since uncertainty creates a reward
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for waiting; therefore, an increase in uncertainty will reduce private investment (Dixit,
1989).
A number of studies concentrate on the impact of democracy, and institutional
solvency on economic policy. Haggard and Webb (1994) argue that decentralization can
provide powerful incentives for good policy. Conversely, poorly designed federal
arrangements can generate a variety of undesirable outcomes, from severe
macroeconomic imbalances and slow growth, to poor delivery of services, corruption and
inequity across jurisdictions. Haggard and Kaufman (1995) argue that differences within
regime types are likely to have more effect on the capacity to initiate reform than is
regime type itself. On the other hand, Remmer (1990) argued that regime type makes no
difference to economic reform, at least in Latin America. Kubota and Milner (1999)
show how democratization of political system reduces the ability of governments to use
trade barriers as a strategy for building political support.
The distinction between this paper and others is that: first, this study jointly
examines the effect of macroeconomic uncertainty and political instability on private
investment; second, it analyzes several methods to measure political instability; third for
policy implications, it examines the impact of political instability and macroeconomic
uncertainty on private investment by controlling for each other in order to determine
which one has a larger impact on private investment; and fourth, it examines which
socio-political factors affect relative price uncertainty. This is important because policy
makers can use this information to develop the necessary instruments to ensure that
adjustment is not only efficient, but also shared in a socially acceptable manner.
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CHAPTER III
RELATIVE PRICE UNCERTAINTY, POLICY SUSTAINABILITY AND PRIVATE
INVESTMENT
The objectives of this chapter are 1) to estimate an "uncertainty measure" to
proxy relative price certainty, 2) analyze the effect of relative price uncertainty and
attempts of policy reversal on aggregate private investment, 3) describe the data and
discuss individual country analysis as well as panel analysis, and 4) provide conclusions
and recommendations for further research.
Measure of Relative Price Uncertainty
The volatility in relative prices is high in Latin America. How does this volatility
affect investment decisions? A high volatility in real exchange rates makes price signals
less informative about the relative profitability of investment across sectors, and will
likely hamper the investment decision.
Various proxies of uncertainty have been implemented in empirical studies. A
simple approximation of uncertainty is given by the standard deviation of the variable in
question. This measure, adopted by Akhat and Hilton (1984) and Gotur (1985), would be
consistent only if the distribution of the variable in question is normally distributed.
Evidence, however, shows that exchange rates are usually not normally distributed
(Friedman and Vandersteel, 1982).
One way to overcome this problem is to use the standard deviation of the rate of
change of the exchange rate. This approach captures higher frequency movements and
avoids the mean-variance critique. However, the results are in general very volatile and a
procedure for smoothing the series is usually recommended (Cushman, 1983; Kenen and
Rodrik, 1986). The use of either a four or an eight moving average process of the
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exchange rate makes the proxy exceedingly dependent on past values. As pointed out by
Pagan and Ulah (1986), this procedure could lead to an underestimation of the effect of
variability on decision.
A proxy of exchange rate calculated from observed, past values would be
unconditional and ex post (Seabra, 1995). Entrepreneurial decisions are influenced by
expected, ex ante uncertainty. Exchange rate uncertainty should, then, be defined
conditional on some information set. Forward exchange rates could be viewed as the
expected exchange rate and then the difference between forward rates and actual rates
could be seen as a measure of variability. However, the problem of forward exchange
rates is that they tend to be exceedingly volatile and not representative of the market as a
whole. Besides, forward exchange rates are not developed in many Latin American
countries (Seabra, 1995). Therefore, the predicted exchange rate has to be estimated
under the assumption that firms form their expectations making use of all available
information.
In Kenen and Rodrik (1986) the exchange rate uncertainty variable is proxied by
forecast errors derived from simple time-series models of the real exchange rate (AR(1)
processes and log-linear trends). In this type of model the uncertainty measure is the
unconditional estimated variance, which does not account for all relevant available
information. To include all the relevant information we computed the conditional
variance of the exchange rate as the relevant proxy of the exchange rate uncertainty by
estimating a generalized autore essive conditional heteroscedasticity model (GARCH)
for the exchange rates.
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The GARCH Model
The GARCH model, originally developed by Bollerslev (1986), allows for a type
of heteroseedasticity in time-series models in which the conditional variance of the
forecast error depends on previous conditional variances and squared forecast errors. The
conditional variance is a function of all relevant available information. The square root
of the estimated conditional variance will represent the "uncertainty measure", therefore
encompassing the investors' expectations. For each country i, I estimated the following
GARCH(1,1) model:
reri, = co + alreri a +l (3.1)
2 = atI + r .6 + ro 2 (3.2)
where reriit represents the real exchange rate index, 2 denotes the conditional variance
of sit (the forecast error for the exchange rate equation) based on information up to period
t. I estimated this two-equation model. The square root of uji from equation (3.2)
represents the "measure of uncertainty" of the real exchange rate.
Using ordinary least squares on observed data to estimate the real exchange rate
equation has two drawbacks: it uses all the sample data to set the forecasting rule for the
beginning of the sample, and it presupposes that the parameters a. are time-invariant.
GARCH avoids these problems by creating a forecast based only on available
information up to time t.
In the preliminary analysis I estimated equations (3.1) and (3.2) for other measures of uncertainty:
inflation, interest rate, the growth of output and the tenns of trade. However, only the relative price
uncertainty had a statistically significant effect on private investment. Thus, I dropped the other measures
from the study.
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Estimating the Relationship Between Aggregate Investment and Uncertainty
Assuming that investment is an increasing function of the expected profitability of
a sector, one can set up the following empirical equation:
lit = io + i It + A2 y- + /3 0 r> + A4( t + /J 5INDIC, + ''i6 d, + u, (3.3)
where It represents the logarithm of private investment, It_, represents the logarithm of
lagged private investment, YtM represents the logarithm of lagged Gross Domestic
Product, rti represents the lagged real interest rate measuring the cost of capital, ICt
is the proxy for the probability of policy reversal due to budgetary irresponsibility, dt is a
vector of dummy variables, and at is the "uncertainty measure". The residual u, is
assumed to have standard regression properties. Equation (3.3) is estimated using
ordinary least squares2 .
Following Conway's (1990) work, to proxy for the possibility of policy reversal
due to budgetary irresponsibility, an indicator variable INDIC, is constructed, taking the
value of "1" for the year in which the real interest rate exceeds the growth rate of real
GDP. Otherwise it takes the value of "0".
Several econometric issues must be addressed for proper estimation of equation
(3.3). First, since we are using annual data for fixed private investment, real GDP, real
interest rate, and index for the real exchange rate, unit roots may be present; therefore, I
check for non-stationarity. Unit root tests and correlograms gave opposite results: none
of the correlograms indicated slowly decaying correlations while all unit root tests
indicated non-stationarity. Given the small sample of observations and the low power of
2 I added to equation (3.3) a dummy variable to capture the type of regime and only in the case of Argentina
and Bolivia it was negative and statistically significant.
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unit root tests, we followed the correlogram results and treated the variables as stationary.
Also, regression (3.3) was estimated in differences using OLS and they yielded similar
results to those obtained utilizing the levels of the economic variables.
The second important issue is the problem of endogeneity between real GDP and
private investment. I initially estimated equation (3.3) using contemporaneous values of
GDP, and rir; then, I used the DWH (1978) test and the results indicated that there are
no endogeneity problems. Nevertheless, equation (3.3) was estimated using the lagged
values of the right hand side variables in order to rule out completely the possibility of
endogeneity.
Macro Data
This project was completed using data compiled yearly between 1970-1996 from
eight Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico,
Peru, and Venezuela. All data was gathered from the World Development Indicators
database of the World Bank. Real private investment is at constant prices; the nominal
interest rate is represented by the lending rate (presented as the average for the year);
other series include the real gross domestic product at constant prices, the real exchange
rate index (1990=100), and inflation (the annual percentage change in the consumer price
index). Real effective exchange rate is the nominal effective exchange rate (a measure
of the value of a currency against a weighted average of several foreign currencies)
divided by a price deflator or index of costs. The real interest rate is calculated by
subtracting the concurrent inflation from the nominal interest rate.
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Individual Country Analysis
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 present the empirical results for the private investment model.
Examining the results, it can be seen that the measure of private investment uncertainty
has a negative coefficient significantly different from zero. The R2 in most of the
regressions is above 0.70 indicating that the model has good explanatory power. Overall,
the regressions seem to be well-specified. The modified Durbin Watson (1951) test
indicated that serial correlation is not present, except in a couple of regressions. The
Jaque-Bera statistic showed normality of the residuals. The Hausman test statistic
showed that there are no simultaneity problems. The stability tests, Cusum and Cusum
Square, indicated coefficient stability in almost all regressions4.
All the tables follow the same format. Those coefficients marked with asterisks
are significantly different from zero at 10 percent level of significance and those with two
asterisks are significantly different from zero at 5 percent level of significance; standard
errors are in parenthesis. There are three variables that are systematically significant in
their contributions to private investment decisions: lagged private investment, lagged real
gross domestic product and relative price uncertainty.
Argentina
The estimated coefficients from regressing equation (3.3) and the appropriate
statistics are shown in table 3.1. Examining the results, it can be seen that most of the
3 Variable addition/deletion tests were used to obtain the final form of the estimated regression.
Real Gross Domestic Product is not taken into account in some regressions because the R
2 falls and the
Akaike Information Criterion increases when this variable is included.
a See Greene (2000) for a discussion of these diagnostic statistics.
s The Cusum and Cusum Square tests were applied after incorporating a number of structural dummy
variables in the regressions.
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coefficients are statistically significant either at 0.05 level or 0.10 level. The adjusted R2
is above .88 indicating that the model has good explanatory power. The lagged private
investment has a positive significant effect on private investment. The real interest rate
and the real exchange rate uncertainty have a negative significant effect on private
investment.
These findings are supported by historical events. Argentina tried unsuccessfully
to stabilize inflation in the 1970s through crawling peg. Over the course of the 1980s,
Argentina governments implemented successive inflation stabilization plans involving
currency reforms, price controls, and other measures.
The fundamental problem of government deficits was not repaired and the new
programs, after a short initial period of success, failed. Pervasive economic instability
spilled over to affect private investment. Argentina faced hyperinflation.
Finally in 1991 Argentina turned to radical institutional and economic reforms to
end its sad history of inflation. Import tariffs were slashed, government expenditures
were cut, major state companies were privatized and tax reforms led to increase
government revenues.
The most important component of the economic reforms was the Convertibility
Law. This new approach had a dramatic effect on inflation, which has remained very
low after dropping from 800 percent in 1990 to well under 5 percent by 1995.
Continuing inflation in the first years of the convertibility plan, despite a fixed exchange
rate, implied a steep appreciation of the peso. From 1990 to 1995 the currency
appreciated in real terms by about 30 percent.
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After the Mexican financial crisis, speculators attacked Argentina's currency and
domestic interest rates rose sharply. Unexpectedly higher borrowing cost and uncertainty
of the real exchange rate created a decline in private investment.
Argentina used the Convertibility Law in an attempt to control the uncertainty of
the exchange rate. However, in December of 2001 Argentina experienced a large budget
deficit, an overvalued currency and recession for 4 years. These factors created
uncertainty about the exchange rate, people demanded more dollars and this putted
pressure on the Argentinean peso. The Convertibility Law ended in January of 2002.
Bolivia
The estimated coefficients from regressing equation (3.3) and the appropriate
statistics are shown in table 3.1. Examining the results, it can be seen that most of the
coefficients are statistically significant either at 0.05 level or 0.10 level. The adjusted R2
is above .92 indicating that the model has good explanatory power. The lagged private
investment, the lagged real GDP and the dummy D98 have a positive significant effect on
private investment. The real interest rate has a negative (not statistically significant)
effect on private investment. Finally, the real exchange rate uncertainty has a negative
significant effect on private investment.
These findings are supported by historical events. Investment declined steadily
during the 1980s. The first half of the decade was characterized by macroeconomic
turbulence that ended in the hyperinflation of 1984-85. Then, in August of 1985 the
government introduced a sharp and successful program to stabilize inflation, which went
form the five-digit level of hyperinflation to an average of about 20 percent in the second
half of the 1980s. The main problem Bolivia experienced in its stabilization effort was a
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lack of per capita growth and any significant response by private investment in the
aftermath of the stabilization.
Why private investment remained stagnant after the reforms? Inflation was under
control but the fiscal deficit was still high (near 5 percent in 1986-90) and the economy
highly dollarized (Morales, 1991), the macroeconomic environment was still unstable
hampering a recovery of private investment. Consequently, macroeconomic instability
and uncertainty of the real exchange rate affect negatively private investment.
Brazil
The results for equation (3.3) are shown in table 3.1. Most coefficients are
statistically significant at 0.05 level or 0.10 level. The adjusted R2 is above .75 indicating
that the model has good explanatory power.
Lagged private investment, lagged real GDP and the dummy D80 have a positive
effect on private investment. On the other hand the real interest rate has a negative
impact on private investment. Finally, real exchange rate uncertainty has a negative
effect on private investment.
These findings have useful implications. Inflation tends to result in
overvaluation: investors fear the exchange rate risk as well as economic instability.
Uncertainty about prices brings about short horizons for production decisions and capital
flight also rises with inflation. Brazil has a history of experiencing high levels of inflation
and it has used several stabilization programs to reduce inflation. For example, the Real
Plan was used to bring about a rapid reduction of inflation, without having large, harmful
costs in term of output. This kind of program is called an exchange rate-based
stabilization because it is based in a pegged exchange rate. Experience has shown that
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the first result of stabilization policies is recession. How long the recession lasts depends
on how fast the economy adjusts to new relative prices. In the meantime, falling standard
of living and political unrest often become a result of such policies. This leads to
overvaluation, uncertainty about the economy, and finally to foreign exchange crises.
Capital flight is a consequence of stabilization programs based on pegged
exchange rate. For example, in 1997 there were expectations that the real would
devaluate and this created capital flight. Brazil in order to defend its overvalued currency
pushed interest rates to 35% more than inflation and ordered tax rises and spending cuts.
The high interest rates deter investment in capital goods. Both effects, uncertainty in the
exchange rate and high interest rates hampered private investment.
Chile
The estimated coefficients from regressing equation (3.3) and the appropriate
statistics are shown in table 3.1. Examining the results, it can be seen that most of the
coefficients are statistically significant either at 0.05 level or 0.10 level. The adjusted R2
is 0.93 indicating that the model has good explanatory power. The lagged private
investment and the real interest rate have a negative (not statistically significant) effect on
private investment. The lagged GDP has a positive significant effect on private
investment. Finally, the real exchange rate uncertainty and the dummy D73 (capturing
the effects of the stabilization reforms) have a negative significant effect on private
investment.
The experience of Chile is interesting in several respects. First, it started its
reforms earlier (in the mid 1970s) than the countries in the region. Second, at the time
the reforms started to be applied, the Chilean economy exhibited large macroeconomic
29
instability in the form of high rates of inflation (over three digit by the mid-1970s) and a
large fiscal deficit.
On taking power in September 1973, the regime of Agusto Pinochet sharply
devalued the currency, eliminated price controls, demobilized labor, and restricted
monetary growth. As a result of these measures, interest rates went from -24 percent to
178 percent, businesses were forced into bankruptcy, unemployment increased, inflation
was far from under control, and GDP fell 14 percent in 1975 while prices quadrupled.
All these facts hampered private investment (Cardoso, 1993).
Monetary reform introduced the peso, each worth 1,000 escudos, and in 1976, the
government adopted a policy of preannouncing the exchange rate for each month. The
monthly devaluations lagged behind inflation, and in 1979, the regime went even further,
fixing the exchange rate at 39 pesos per dollar, a rate that lasted for three years.
Borrowing was easy in the late 1970s, especially because Chile enjoyed some attractive
characteristics. By preannouncing the exchange rate, the government assured investors
that, at least in the short run, they would not be caught by a sudden drop in the dollar
value of their earnings from local investments. Furthermore, the liberalization of
financial markets had increased Chilean interest rates well above international rates. This
meant that deposits and short-term loans to Chilean firms were both lucrative and
relatively riskless. Finally, bankers' concerns about political instability declined.
Inflation dropped with the implementation of exchange rate stability. The
economy grew rapidly for four years, finally recovering the level of output it had enjoyed
in 1972 by 1978.
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Then what went wrong? The fixed exchange rate resulted in the increasing
overvaluation of the peso. Despite high copper prices, export growth fell while imports
rose to 1.7 times the level of exports in 1981 (Cardoso, 1993). Across-the board tariffs of
only 10 percent (except for automobiles) put local products at a new disadvantage
relative to imports. Combined with overvaluation, the new openness of the economy
stifled production for the domestic market. Tight monetary policy produced high interest
rates. Banks collapsed, and capital flight began.
Chile was hit by the debt crisis. GDP fell 14 percent in 1982 and unemployment
rose to 21 percent. Investors' lack of confidence in the local currency held their assets in
dollars putting pressure on the peso. The peso was sharply devalued in 1982, bringing to
a close any attempt to achieve disinflation with a fixed rate. Consequently, once again
macroeconomic uncertainty created capital flight.
Colombia
The estimated coefficients from regressing equation (3.3) and the appropriate
statistics are shown in table 3.2. Examining the results, it can be seen that most of the
coefficients are statistically significant either at 0.05 level or 0.10 level. The adjusted R2
is 0.93 indicating that the model has good explanatory power. The lagged private
investment, the lagged real GDP, and the dummy D9394 have a positive statistically
significant effect on private investment. The real interest rate and the dummy D99
(captures the decline in real GDP due to political unrest) have a negative effect on private
investment. Finally, the real exchange rate uncertainty has a negative significant effect
on private investment.
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Private investment was pretty much stable during the seventies. The debt crisis of
the early 1980's created a decrease in economic growth as well as in private investment.
The macroeconomic climate was more stable than that prevailing in the other countries at
the time of the reforms, and the country's microeconomic strength was greater in relation
to the smaller countries in the region (Moguillansky, 2001). These two factors boosted
private investment. However, trade liberalization introduced a high degree of uncertainty
into investment decisions. Another factor contributing to increased uncertainty was the
political unrest that they face until today.
Mexico
The estimated coefficients from regressing equation (3.3) and the appropriate
statistics are shown in table 3.2. Examining the results, it can be seen that most
coefficients are statistically significant at 0.05 level of significance or 0.10 level of
significance. The adjusted R2 is 0.95 indicating that the model has good explanatory
power. The lagged of private investment is statistically significant and has a positive
effect on private investment. The real interest rate has a negative impact on private
investment. The dummy variables D83 and D95 have a statistically significant negative
effect on private investment. Mexico experienced two major episodes of capital flight.
The dummy variable D83 is used to capture the sharp decline in private investment
growth due to capital flight in 1983 as a consequence of the debt crisis that erupted in
1982. The variable D95 captures the "Tequila Crisis". The real exchange rate
uncertainty has a negative impact on private investment.
These findings have useful implications. Expected depreciation of the currency
is important in the context of periods of overvaluation. When it is widely perceived that
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an extreme devaluation lies ahead, capital flight becomes massive. Therefore, any
private investment abroad is disadvantageous to the domestic economy. Mexico
experienced two major episodes of capital flight. The first one was after the debt crisis in
1983 and, the second one was in 1994 known as the "Tequila Crisis". Private Investment
declined sharply as a result of capital flight.
Capital flight from Mexico increased Mexican interest rates and decreased the
value of the Mexican peso in the market for foreign-currency exchange. This is exactly
what was observed in 1994. From November 1994 to March 1995, the interest on short-
term Mexican government bonds rose from 14 percent to 70 percent, and the peso
depreciated in value from 29 to 15 U.S. cents per peso. The increase in interest rate to
reward asset holders for the "risk" of holding domestic assets hinders private investment
in capital goods. Therefore, the reduced capital formation implies slower growth of the
economy.
Peru
The estimated coefficients from regressing equation (3.3) and the appropriate
statistics are shown in table 3.2. Examining the results, it can be seen that most
coefficients are statistically significant at 0.05 level or 0.10 level. The adjusted R2 is 0.89
indicating that the model has good explanatory power. The lagged of private investment
and lagged real GDP, and the dummies D90 and D9495 are statistically significant and
have a positive effect on private investment. The real interest rate has a negative impact
on private investment. Finally the real exchange rate uncertainty and the dummy D8385
are statistically significant and have a negative influence on private investment.
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Peruvian private investment was weakened by economic and political instability
of the 1980s. The capacity of investors to adopt defensive strategies in the face of
liberalization was adversely affected not only by hyperinflation, but also by stabilization
measures. Economic reform therefore contributed more to the weakening of private
investment than to its strengthening.
The low levels of private investment are explained by the high incidence of idle
capacity, severe microeconomic weakness, the absence of any stimulus from export-
oriented production, and a lack of interest on the part of transnationals in achieving
positions in the domestic market (Moguilansky, 2001).
Such microeconomic uncertainty combined with and was fuelled by unfavorable
macroeconomic conditions that hindered investment decisions. The stabilization of
prices and of political and social conditions introduced the minimum necessary
conditions for a recovery in investment. However, private investment was still hindered
by high interest rates and a current account deficit. The external disequilibrium generated
uncertainty about future macroeconomic performance, and it introduced a considerable
degree of caution into investment decisions (Moguillansky, 2001).
Venezuela
The estimated coefficients from regressing equation (3.3) and the appropriate
statistics are shown in table 3.2. Examining the results, it can be seen that most of the
coefficients are statistically significant either at 0.05 level or 0.10 level. The adjusted R2
is 0.71 indicating that the model has good explanatory power. The lagged private
investment and the dummy D84 (captures the increase in real GDP after the devaluation
34
of the bolivar in 1983) have a positive significant effect on private investment. The real
exchange rate uncertainty has a negative significant effect on private investment.
These findings are supported by historical events. For example, in 1989
Venezuela experienced high fixed interest rates in order to attract foreign capital,
however investors where concern with the political unrest and the stability of the
economy. The macroeconomic instability deterred private investment.
The second Perez administration launched substantial policy reforms which
included the elimination of budget deficits, restructure of the financial sector by allowing
the interest rates to fluctuate with market rates, and exchange rate adjustments. Despite
their initial inflationary effect, these policies created incentives for saving and investment
among investors, thereby attracting and retaining capital.
Summary of Results
The common characteristic of all equations is the robust negative impact of
relative price (real exchange rate) uncertainty on private investment. This result is
supported by historical events. Latin American countries to stabilize their economies
have relied on a combination of policies that reduce expenditures and switch spending
toward domestic goods. The switch generally includes a real devaluation that leads to
relative price uncertainty creating significant consequences for investment. Thus,
uncertainty plays a key role in investment decisions because they are largely irreversible.
From a policy perspective, a stable incentive structure and macroeconomic policy
environment are as important as the level of the tax incentives or the interest rates.
other words, if uncertainty is high, investment incentives may have to be very large to
have any significant effect.
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Output was found to be significant only in the case of Brazil. This means that
changes in output is an important determinant of private investment. Therefore, a
contraction in demand induced by adjustment measures is likely to have an adverse short-
run effect on investment because of its negative effect on the growth of output. This
effect can be explained in the context of the Q theory of investment. Solimano (1992)
showed that in Chile aggregate investment profitability is procyclical, so the market value
of capital, and hence investment, would be expected to fall in the short run in response to
an exogenous slowdown in economic activity.
The downturn may also affect investment through its effect on expectations. A
recession, for instance, could lead investors to postpone investing until the economy is
recovered. This response might in turn delay the recovery, and the economy might get
stuck in a low investment equilibrium because of self-fulfilling pessimism.
The level of the real interest rate, so often found important in earlier studies, plays
an insignificant and unpredictable role here; only in Argentina is its contribution as
predicted by theory.
The variable INDICt, used as a proxy for policy reversal, is insignificant in
explaining private investment when entered in the equation; therefore, it has been deleted
from all the equations. Some of the dummy variables representing trend changes are
statistically significant in all the countries, and are important in allowing the uncertainty
variable to explain private investment.
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Panel Data Analysis
In this section I combine annual data covering the period of 1970 to 1996 for Argentina,
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela and estimate a dynamic panel
model for private investment. The empirical equation now takes the form:
It = 'Z + I I i + Y,t- + 1 ri + Aor + D + 41 t (3.4)
where the left hand side variable denotes the log of fixed private investment in country i
and year t, rirt is the real interest rate, Yt is the real gross domestic product, at is the
relative price uncertainty measure, and D83 is a dummy variable used to capture the
sharp decline in private investment growth due to capital flight in 1983 as a consequence
of the debt crisis that erupted in 1982. The residual it is assumed to have standard
regression properties.
A dynamic panel model was used due to the fact that one of the explanatory
variables is the lagged value of the dependent variable. Since there is correlation
between the lag of private investment and the error term, equation (3.4) cannot be
consistently estimated using least squares (see Greene [2002], chapter 13). Therefore, the
model is estimated in differences using instrumental variables utilizing as instruments the
differences of the exogenous variables and the lagged difference of the dependent
variable.
Panel Analysis: Policy Reversal
In this section I am interested in examining the link between relative price
uncertainty, reversal of policy and private investment for Argentina, Bolivia, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.
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My hypotheses that policy reversal and relative price uncertainty have a negative
effect on private investment can be explained by the following reasoning. First,
uncertainty about government effectiveness can be more adverse than the policy itself by
deterring investors from committing their assets. Given a bad policy with certainty about
its execution, the investor can still find ways to make money. However, if the
government lacks consistency in its policy execution, investors will delay their
investment until becomes clear that the government is consistent in executing policy.
The fundamental rationale for the negative effect of policy uncertainty on private
investment is that the uncertainty regarding government effectiveness creates a reward
for waiting; therefore, an increase in uncertainty will reduce private investment (Dixit,
1989) Second, relative price uncertainty measured by the implied volatility of the
exchange rate has important effects on profitability through its impact on the relative
price of capital goods. When sunk costs of entry are combined with uncertain future real
exchange rates, firms are discouraged from entering the market even though favorable
current exchange rates would seem to make entry profitable.
I examine the association between policy reversal and relative price uncertainty
with private investment by estimating the following empirical equation:
it =YO + Yi Yu- + 72 ri- + Y3 (it- + Y4 INDIC ,t- + y5D83 + yt (3.5)
where the left hand side variable denotes the log of fixed private investment in country i
and year t, rirt is the real interest rate, Yt is the real gross domestic product and ot is the
relative price uncertainty measure, and NDICt is the proxy for policy reversal. The
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residual y, is assumed to have standard regression properties. Equation (3.5) is
estimated in differences using GLS with fixed effects and Cross Section Weights.
Results
Table 3.3 presents empirical results for the Dynamic Panel Model. The main
results can be summarized as follows. First, the uncertainty measure has a negative and
statistically significant impact on private investment. As argued earlier in this paper, the
stability of the exchange rate is a crucial variable for sustained growth in private
investmnent levels. The failure of investment to pick up in several Latin American
countries may reflect the lack of confidence on the part of the private sector in the ability
of the authorities to keep the exchange rate from depreciating again, and hence
expectations are that the decline in inflation may be only temporary.
Second, the coefficient of the real interest rate is statistically significant and of the
expected sign. This finding suggests that monetary and credit policies included in
stabilization packages affect private investment in two ways: they raised the real cost of
bank credit; and, by raising interest rates, they increase the opportunity cost of retained
earnings. Both mechanisms raise the user cost of capital and lead to a reduction in
investment. Also, most Latin American countries experience high fiscal deficits. High
fiscal deficits push interest rates up or reduce the availability of credit to the private
sector, or both, crowding out private investment.
Third, the real gross domestic product has a positive and statistically significant
effect on private investment. As mentioned before, this implies that a contraction in
6 I added to equation (3.5) a dummy variable to capture the effect of the type of regime on fixed private
investment and it was found that it has not a significant impact on fixed private investment.
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aggregate demand induced by adjustment measures most likely will have an adverse
short-run effect on investment because of its negative effect on output growth.
Table 3.4 reports the results using both relative price uncertainty and policy
reversal as factors affecting fixed private investment. All economic variables with
exception of the real interest rate are significant at the 5% level and have the expected
sign in column (1). An increase in output will increase investors' optimism of the future
motivating them to invest more. Also, a decrease of relative price uncertainty will create
a stable climate for private investment inducing investors to invest more today. The
results are consistent with the ones of the dynamic panel model confirming the robustness
of my results.
Examining the coefficient of column (2) in table 3.4 we can say that the proxy for
policy reversal is statistically significant and has a negative impact on private investment.
This means that if policy measures are perceived to be inconsistent or temporary
investors will prefer to wait and see before committing resources to irreversible fixed
investments. Therefore, transitory investment incentives can be used as tools to spur
investment, in practice they run the risk of destabilizing public finances, which often are
key element in adjustment programs. contrast, sufficient external support for the
stabilization effort may raise investor's confidence in the sustainability of the adjustment
and set the stage for investment to takeoff (Dombusch, 1991).
Column (3) in table 3.4 presents the results of the regression that includes relative
price uncertainty and possibility of policy reversal as determinants of private investment.
All the economic variables as well as the proxy for policy reversal are significant at the
5% level and have the expected sign. For policy implications, policy-makers have to take
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care of both problems at the same time, relative price uncertainty and possibility of policy
reversal, order to attract private investment. This will be discussed in depth in the next
section.
summary in the panel estimation we have achieved the same results as in the
single country estimation with exception of policy reversal. The most important result is
that the relative price uncertainty measure has a statistically significant adverse effect on
private investment in both cases. However, reversal of policies has statistically
significant impact on private investment only in the panel analysis due to the fact that I
have more observations.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
Most Latin American countries had gone through structural reforms, stabilization
programs, and privatization in order to stimulate private investment. So far, analysis on
the empirical determinants of private investment behavior has focused on the movements
in relative prices of credit and final goods. This paper suggests that it is equally
important to consider the effect of the uncertainty in these relative prices. Using a proxy
for relative price (real exchange rate) uncertainty and policy reversal rates, two principal
conclusions emerge: 1) relative price uncertainty has a negative and statistically
significant impact on private investment; and 2) proxy for the possibility of policy
reversal has a significant negative effect on private investment.
The relevance of these results for macroeconomic policy in Latin American
countries is very important. Latin America suffers from high, unpredictable inflation and
variability of relative prices. The findings on irreversible investment suggest that
changes in prices affect sectoral incentives may then be ineffective in stimulating
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investment. It may take some time before investors are convinced that the changes are
permanent. The decision to implement an adjustment program may well increase
uncertainty in the short run, as private agents get mixed signals about the efficiency and
consistency of the policy. Therefore, the government has to take care of both problems,
relative price uncertainty and policy consistency, in order to provide a stable environment
for private investment.
Countries attempting structural change through relative-price adjustment, such as
depreciations of the exchange rate, should take into account not only the positive
efficiency gains anticipated through the relative-price adjustments; but also the losses in
private investment and the impact on future economic growth due to the increased
uncertainty. Necessary changes in relative prices could still occur, but government policy
should focus on eliminating excess variability in price movements in order to provide an
appropriate environment for investment.
Government policy instability is another source of discouragement for investors.
Unless investors view the adjustment as internally consistent and are convinced the
government will carry it out despite the implied social costs, the possibility of reversal
will become a key determinant of investment decisions. In order to activate and maintain
an inflow of private investment in their economies, governments in Latin American
countries should emphasize consistent policy. They should develop the necessary
instruments to ensure that adjustment is not only efficient but also consistent. In this
context the choice between gradual and abrupt stabilization is important. Gradual
adjustment involves modest objectives that can be achieved and that are intended to
strengthen the government's reputation. In contrast, an abrupt adjustment involves drastic
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changes, for example a large devaluation of the exchange rate to stimulate the quick
reallocation of resources; even though it could also increase the social costs. The choice
will largely depend on the social distribution of the costs of adjustment. Therefore, this
highlights the importance of social safety nets and a progressive flexible tax system to
balance equity and efficiency in order to maintain the radical change, to build
institutional credibility, and over time to help reduce investors' fear of policy reversal.
In summary, from a policy perspective, a stable incentive structure and
macroeconomic policy environment may be important for investment as the level of the
tax incentives or the interest rate. In other words, if uncertainty is high, investment
incentives may have to be very large to have any significant effect.
This study is a first attempt to measure the impact of relative price uncertainty and
policy reversal on private investment in developing economies in Latin and Central
America. However, we have to be aware that a reversal of policy is an endogeneous
outcome, since the private sector ultimately determines whether the adjustment program
can be sustained. Therefore, further research should analyze this indeterminacy between
private investment and policy reversal for policy implications.
Also, further research should be directed in finding other factors that can affect
private investment. Latin America has been characterized by experiencing political
instability; therefore it will be interesting to examine the link between socio-political
instability and private investment in Latin America.
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Table 3.1 Private Investment and Relative Price Uncertainty: Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil and Chile (dependent variable: log of real fixed private investment)
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile
Constant 3.22 -21.49 5.09 -10.96
(1.09) (6.90) (1.37) (3.47)
Ln (Ita) 0.72** 0.16 0.56** -0.04
(0.10) (0.21) (0.12) (0.14)
Ln(GDPt 1) 2.84 1.66**
(0.83) (0.31)
rirt -3.91E-05** -2.2E-03 -2.14E-06 -4.6E-03
(1.12E-05) (1.3E-03) (2.59E-06) (5.5E-03)
ot(rert) -1.21** -3.36** -1.27** -2.86**
(0.36) (1.64) (0.53) (0.02)
D73 -1.81**
(0.33)
D80 0.30**
(0.10)
D98 0.60**
(0.21)
R2 0.83 0.93 0.77 0.93
S.E. of Regr. 0.15 0.18 0.09 0.28
Durbin-Watson 1.56 1.74 1.66 1.32
Akaike criterion -1.79 -0.33 -1.75 0.48
Jaque-Bera 0.87 1.39 0.33 1.58
(0.64) (0.50) (0.84) (0.45)
DWH test 0.99 0.29 053 0.15
Cusum test + + +
Cus Square + + +
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Coefficients significant at 10 percent level.
** Coefficients significant at 5 percent level.
Jaque-Bera is a normality test for the residuals and the p-value is in parentheses.
DWH is a simultaneity test among variables and the p-value is reported.
Cusum and Cusum Square are Stability Tests: a + sign means are inside the boundaries.
at measured by the conditional variance from GARCH (1,1) estimates.
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Table 3.2 Private Investment and Relative Price Uncertainty: Colombia, Mexico,
Peru adVenezuela (dependent variable: log of real fixed private investment)
Colombia Mexico Peru Venezuela
Constant 0.69 -0,65 -12.28 2.15
(2.36) (0.93) (5.0) (1.30)
Ln(It_) 0.56** 0.88** 0.16 0.82**
(0.14) (0.13) (0.23) (0.12)
Ln(GDPti1 ) 0.36* 0.16 1.77**
(0.18) (0.15) (0.40)
rirt -4.89E-03 -8.63E-04 -3.76E-05 -1.22E-03
(4.39E-03) (1,13E-03) (2.77E-05) (1.7E-03)
o-t(rert) -3.41* -0.97** -0.95** -2.90**
(1.84) (0.46) (0.40) (1.17)
D83 
-0.31**
(0.09)
D84 0.78**
(0.24)
D8385 -045**
(0.12)
D90 0.37*
(0.20)
D9394 0.41**
(0.09)
D9495 0.36**
(0.12)
D95 -0.41**
(0.09)
D99 -0.53**
(-0.12)
R 0.93 0.95 0.89 0.71
S.E. of Regr. 0.10 0.08 0.15 0.20
Durbin-Watson 2.52 1.91 1.55 1.47
Akaike criterion -1.54 -1.85 -0.72 -0.20
Jaque-Bera 0.90 0.40 1.53 1.84
(0.63) (0.81) (0.46) (0.39)
DWH test 0.65 0.59 0.19 0.70
Cusum test + + + +
Cusum Square + + +
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Coefficients significant at 10 percent level.
** Coefficients significant at 5 percent level.
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Table 3.3 Private Investment and Relative Price Uncertainty: Panel Analysis
(dependent variable: difference of real fixed private investment)
Variable (1)
A Ln (It-,) 0.14
(0.20)
A Ln(GDP t1) 0.88*
(0.46)
A rirt 
-3.97E-06*
(2.37E-06)
A Gt(rert) 
-1.63**
(0.72)
A D83 (-0.20)**
(0.07)
Notes:
All right-hand side variables are expressed in first differences.
GMM standard errors in parentheses.
* Coefficients significant at 10 percent level.
** Coefficients significant at 5 percent level.
at measured by the conditional variance from GARCH (1,1) estimates.
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Table 3.4 Private Investment, Relative Price Uncertainty and Policy Reversal
(dependent variable: difference of real fixed private investment)
(1) (2) (3)
A Ln(GDPt 1) 1.02** 0.84** 0.83**
(0.33) (0.27) 0.28
A rirt.1  -2.97 E-06 -3.5 E-06** -3.65 E-06**
(2.25 E-06) (2.10 E-06) (2.15 E-06)
A ot(rert.1) -0.47** -0.43**
(0.25) (0.24)
INDICt1  -0.06** -0.05*
(0.03) (0.04)
D83 
-0.21** 
-0.21** 
-0.21**
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
R2 0.16 0.17 0.18
S.E. of Regr. 0.20 0.19 0.19
Notes:
All the economic variables in the right-hand side are expressed in first differences.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Coefficients significant at 10 percent level.
** Coefficients significant at 5 percent level.
at measured by the conditional variance from GARCH (1,1) estimates.
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CHAPTER IV
RELATIVE PRICE UNCERTAINTY, POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND PRIVATE
INVESTMENT
The objectives of this chapter are 1) to measure political instability, 2) analyze the
effect of relative price uncertainty and political instability on private investment, 3)
describe the data and discuss the panel analysis, and 4) provide conclusions and
recommendations for further research.
Measuring Political Instability and Relative Price Uncertainty
According to Alesina and Perotti (1996) political instability can be measured in
two ways. The first one emphasizes executive instability. For example, Cukierman et. al
(1992) defined political instability as the probability of a government change as
perceived by the current government. Edwards and Tabellini (1991) constructed an index
that measured the instability of the political system by capturing changes in the political
leadership from the governing party to an opposition party.
The second approach to measure political instability is based upon indicators of
social unrest and political violence. There are a number of empirical studies that have
used several indices of socio-political instability as an explanatory variable in various
regressions in which the dependent variable is growth, savings or investment. For
example Alesina, and Perotti (1996), and Hibb (1973), used the method of principal
components to construct such index. Venieris and Gupta (1986) constructed a socio-
political index by using discriminant analysis.
this study I am viewing political instability based on the second approach. In
addition, instead of directly constructing an index I want to determine if the information
captured in an index contains more or less information than using the individual variables
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separately. The main argument of using socio political variables instead than an index is
that the coefficient of the individual variables is interpretable while the coefficient of the
index is not. For a detailed description of the socio-political variables see table 4.1.
Applying the method of principal components to ASSAS, STRIKE, WAR, GOV,
PUR, RIOT, and REV leads to the following index of socio-political instability and using
the factor loadings of the first principal component:
SPI =0.29 ASSAS + 0.14STRIKE + 0.47 WAR + 0.10 GOV +0.75 PUR + 0.31 REV (4.1)
where SPI represents the socio-political index. Table 4.2 presents the results of principal
components analysis and by examining them I can point out the following conclusions:
first, the first principal component explains only 37% of the variance, and the first two
principal components together explain 61% of the variance. This means it will be
necessary to include more than two principal components in order to explain most of the
original variation of the variables and that beats the whole purpose of using the method of
principal components; and second, the loadings of the first principal component are all of
the same sign but of different size. This means that the influence of the original variables
on the first principal component varies dramatically. Examining the loadings of the first
principal component we can say that assassinations, guerilla warfare, purges and riots
weighted most heavily. These variables contain most of the information captured in the
SPI. Consequently, why use an index instead than the individual variables separately?
The main argument is that if the SPI does not provide additional information than the
individual variables; therefore, I should use the individual variables because their
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coefficients are interpretable and will be useful for policy implications. Later on, I
present evidence that individual variables should be used instead of an index.
Relative price uncertainty will be represented by the "uncertainty measure"
which is mainly the implied volatility of the exchange rate that I estimated in chapter 3.
Model Specification
My hypotheses that political instability and relative price uncertainty have a
negative effect on private investment can be explained by the following reasoning: first,
social unrest causes disruption of productive activities, and therefore a decrease in
productivity of capital and labor; and second, political instability and relative price
uncertainty create a hostile environment for investment inducing investors to postpone
projects, invest abroad (capital flights) or simply consume more. Therefore, high levels
of social and political unrest as well as high levels of relative price uncertainty will
hamper private investment. When social unrest is widespread, the probability of the
govermment being overthrown is higher, making the course of future economic policy and
even protection of property rights more uncertain.
I examine the association between political instability and relative price
uncertainty with private investment by estimating the following empirical equation:
Ii, = Ao + Ayr + $r~e- + f 3 ,o-%, + x ,- + ACONSj 1 + /xD831 3, + 8  (4.2)
where Iit represents the logarithm of private investment, Y i,t-1 represents the logarithm
of lagged Gross Domestic Product, ri,t- represents the lagged real interest rate measuring
the cost of capital, a i,t.1 is the "uncertainty measure" , x it-1 is a vector of socio-political
variables, CONS i,t.1 represents major constitutional changes and D83i,t 1 is used to
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capture the sharp decline in private investment growth due to capital flight in 1983 as a
consequence of the debt crisis that erupted in 1982. The residual i$ is assumed to have
standard regression properties. Equation (4.2) is estimated using GLS with fixed effects
and Cross Section Weights. The variable WAR is insignificant in explaining private
investment when entered in the equation; therefore, it has been deleted from all the
equations.
Data
This project was completed using data compiled yearly between 1970-1996 from
eight Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico,
Peru, and Venezuela. All data was gathered from the World Bank. The economic
variables were collected from the World Development Indicators database. Real private
Investment is at constant prices; the nominal interest rate is represented by the lending
rate (presented as the average for the year); other series include the Real Gross Domestic
Product at constant prices, the real exchange rate index (1990=100), and inflation (the
annual percentage change in the consumer price index). Real effective exchange rate is
the nominal effective exchange rate (a measure of the value of a currency against a
weighted average of several foreign currencies) divided by a price deflator or index of
costs. The real interest rate is calculated by subtracting the concurrent inflation from the
nominal interest rate.
The socio-political variables were collected from the Arthur S. Banks Cross-
National Time-Series Data Archive. For the purpose of this study I classify these
variables in two categories. First, variables that capture social unrest: ASSAS, the
number of politically motivated assassinations, STRIKE, the number of strikes, WAR,
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the number of guerilla warfare, PUR, the number of purges, RIOT, the number of riots,
REV, the number of revolutions. In periods of social unrest both the supply of investment
capital by savers and the demand for capital by investors will decrease. Social unrest puts
investors' decisions to invest their money on physical capital on hold, and motives them
to consume more or send their money abroad. Second, variables that capture instability
of the current regime and measure executive instability: GOV, the number of major
government crises, and CONS, the number of major constitutional changes. According
to Alesina and Perroti (1996) a high propensity of executive changes is associated with
policy uncertainty which can lead to a decrease in private investment. A more detailed
definition of the variables used in this paper is in Table 4.1 Also, SPI will represent an
index obtained by applying the method of principal components to the following
variables: ASSAS, STRIKE, WAR, GOV, PUR, RIOT, and REV.
A number of empirical studies have also used several of the variables that are
included in this paper. Barro (1991) captures political instability by using three variables:
revolutions, coups and assassinations of politicians. Venieris and Gupta (1986)
constructed a socio-political index using the following variables: protest demonstrations,
deaths, and regime type for the year for which data on income distribution is available,
respectively. The index was created by using discriminant analysis. Alesina and Perotti
(1996) construct a socio-political index by applying the method of principal components
to assassinations, death, coups, and democracies.
There is a set of other studies that measure political instability emphasizing on
executive instability. Cukiermna, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) constructed an index
using a probit model that measured political instability using the following variables:
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regular and irregular government transfers, unsuccessful coup attempts, executive
adjustments, and other political events. Edwards and Tabelini (1991) constructed 2
proxies for political instability: 1) the actual frequency of transfers of power in the period
1971-82, and 2) the estimated probability of power transfer obtained from a probit
regression on pooled cross-country time series. Feng (2001) measured political instability
by the variability of political freedom.
Table 4.3 reports the summary statistics for the socio-political variables and tables
4.4 and 4.5 indicate the sample correlations between them. For my analysis I am
interested in determining which individual variables will best represent social unrest and
executive instability.
Examining table 4.3 I can note that the number of incidents on the variables
ASSAS, STRIKE, WAR and RIOT are higher than the other variables. Also, the standard
deviation of the above variables is also larger than the other socio-political variables.
Therefore, for my analysis I take ASSAS, STRIKE, WAR and RIOT to represent social
unrest.
Table 4.4 summarizes the correlations among indicators of social and political
unrest. The general message from this table is that these variables are all positively
correlated with each other and that the magnitude of association between each other
differs. Interestingly, WAR and RIOT seem to have a strong linear relationship with
ASSAS. This implies that an increase in the number of guerilla warfare and the number
of revolutions are associated, on average, with an increase in the number of politically
motivated assassinations, and vice-versa. Also, RIOT is strongly related with all the
other variables in the sample. By contrast, WAR seems particularly strongly associated
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with only two variables: PUR and GOV. Thus, I should consider ASSAS, RIOT and
WAR in my empirical model.
In summary, the descriptive statistics and correlations of various socio-political
variables are on the whole strongly supportive that ASSAS, STRIKE, WAR and RIOT be
used as indicators of social unrest and political violence in my analysis.
Lastly, table 4.5 presents two key correlations: first, private investment and SPI;
and second, private investment and "uncertainty measure". The two correlations are -
0.04, and -0.27. The negative sign of these correlations are consistent with our
hypotheses that socio-political instability and relative price uncertainty are negatively
related with private investment. However, these correlations differ in magnitude.
Interestingly, relative price uncertainty seems to be the most closely associated with
private investment, while the opposite is true for the measure of social unrest and
political violence.
Results
I used GLS estimation to test several models involving political and economic
variables. The results are reported on Tables 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8. Because heteroscedasticity
could be important across countries, the standard errors for the coefficients are based on
White's (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix. All the tables follow the
same format. Those coefficients marked with an asterisk are significantly different from
zero at 10 percent level of significance and those with two asterisks are significantly
different from zero at 5 percent level of significance; standard errors are in parenthesis.
Examining the results, it can be seen that models using political variables do
not explain aggregate private investment as well as economic models. Among the
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political variables in Table 4.6, column (1), only ASSAS and CONS are statistically
significant at the 5% level. All the variables have the expected negative signs, indicating
they have an adverse effect on private investment. In addition, the results of column (2)
in table 4.6 show that the SPI is insignificant and does not have the expected sign.
Based on these results we can conclude that individual socio-political variables have a
statistical significant effect on private investment while the SPI does not.
In contrast, the economic model has more explanatory power than the socio-
political model. Table 4.7 shows the regression results focusing on economic variables.
It can be seen that most of the coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level and
all the variables have the expected sign. Specifically, relative price uncertainty has a
statistically significant negative effect on private investment.
The economic and political model improves the estimation of private investment.
Table 4.8 presents the results of using both political and economic variables. All the
economic variables as well as the political variables are significant at the 5% level and
have the expected sign in column (4) and (5). The main results can be summarized as
follows. First, the relative price uncertainty measure has a negative and statistically
significant impact on private investment. This means the failure of investment to pick up
in Latin American countries could be a consequence of investor's lack of confidence on
government to sustain exchange rate policies.
Second, output has a positive significant effect on private investment. Intuitively
this means that a recession, for instance, could lead investors to postpone investing until
the economy is recovered. Third, the real interest rate has a negative significant impact
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on aggregate private investment. A high level of interest rates raises the real cost of
capital, and therefore dampens private investment.
Fourth, the number of politically motivated assassinations has a negative impact
on private investment. One can argue that a relatively rare event such as the
assassination of a politician disrupts the social and political climate of a country creating
a hostile environment for investment. Fifth, the number of strikes has an adverse
influence on private investment. Intuitively, strikes cause disruption of productive
activities and therefore a decrease in the productivity of capital and labor. Sixth, the
number of riots has an adverse effect on private investment. Intuitively, manifestations
of mass violence create social costs that have a negative impact on the formation and
accumulation of private physical capital. Finally, CONS has a positive effect on private
investment meaning that major constitutional changes in the previous period are
favorable for private investment.
Examining the coefficients of the socio-political variables column (4) and (5) in
table 4.8 we note the following. First, the magnitude of the coefficients of ASSAS,
STRIKE, and RIOT is small: -0.018, -0.02, and -0.02 respectively. Second, the
magnitude of the SPI, -0.05, is larger than the coefficients of ASSAS, STRIKE, and
RIOT. Third, the aggregate value of the coefficients of the socio-political variables
ASSAS, STRIKE, and RIOT is equal to the value of the SPI coefficient. I can conclude
based on these three facts that the information of some of the individual variables used to
construct the index overlap; therefore, for policy implications we will use the individual
variables because their coefficient is interpretable while the coefficient of the SPI is not.
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Table 4.9 presents the elasticities for the economic and political model presented
in table 4.8. I used the coefficients of column (4) and (5) for the construction of these
elasticities. We decided to calculate elasticites for 2 reasons: first, to determine the
degree of impact of the economic as well as political variables on private investment; and
second, to compare the magnitude of impact of the economic variables and socio-political
variables on private investment. Examining column (4a) in table 4.9 I conclude that the
economic variables have a higher impact on private investment than the political
variables. Among the economic variables real gross domestic product has a very strong
effect on private investment. The effect of relative price uncertainty on private
investment is higher than the effect of all the individual socio-political variables. For
policy implications this is important because the government should pay very close
attention to the macroeconomic climate in order to attract investment. Analyzing column
(5a) in table 4.9 we can say once again that the economic variables have a bigger impact
on private investment. Also, we can point out as in the previous case that relative price
uncertainty has a bigger impact than the SPI on private investment.
Table 4.10 analyzes the relationship between political instability and relative price
uncertainty7. PUG and RIOT are significant at the 5% level and have the expected sign.
This means that a high number of purges and riots will increase relative price uncertainty.
Intuitively, the political system needs to have good-will among different social groups
and political parties, so that in the aftermath of a shock, there will no be problems of
hostility and mistrust. Policy makers need to have safety nets as complements of
7 Tables 4.1 a, 4.1 Ob, 4.1 Oc and 4.1Od analyze the relationship between political instability and the other
measures of uncertainty. The SPI has a negative and statistically significant effect only on implied
volatility of the inflation rate and interest rate.
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adjustment programs and/or structural reforms in order to keep a stable environment for
investment; where investors will feel confident to allocate their resources in the
accumulation of physical capital. In addition, SPI has the expected sign but it is not
statistically significant. Intuitively this means that political instability and relative price
uncertainty are not strongly related. Once again this supports the idea that policy
makers have to take into consideration both issues, relative price uncertainty and socio-
political instability at the same time in order to attract private investment.
Finally, in all the equations regardless the model, D83 is statistically significant at
the 5 percent level and has the expected sign. This means that the external debt and
credit rationing due to the external debt may have played relatively important roles in the
slowdown in investment.
Overall, these results show a robust negative impact of relative price
uncertainty on private investment, and a weaker effect of the socio-political variables.
Also, an increase in ASSAS, STRIKE, RIOT will create a threat to property rights and
therefore private investment will decrease because investors will prefer to wait and see,
consume more or send their money elsewhere.
Conclusions
This study has important implications for the design of growth enhancing
macroeconomic adjustment programs. Macroeconomic stability and socio-political
stability are key ingredients for the achievement of a strong investment response. With
high macroeconomic uncertainty, the reaction of investment to changes in incentives is
likely to be very limited. The same will happen if policy sustainability is threatened by
social and political unrest. In such circumstances, investors will prefer to wait and see
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before committing resources to irreversible fixed investments. These results can be
generalized to developing countries that share similar culture, common macroeconomic
problems as well as common socio-political unrest.
Political instability strongly discourages private investment, and thus economic
growth. This highlights the need to develop the state and build a civil society in which
citizens can participate in decision-making and express consent or disagreement without
generating social turmoil. For this purpose, it is important to build free and fair
electoral systems, develop participatory forms of government with an adequate
delegation of authority to the local level, and ensure that police and judiciary systems
enforce equal treatment under the law.
Within this framework of participatory democracy, it is essential to work toward a
wide-ranging consensus on economic strategy, so that changes in government will not
imply radical reversals of the policy framework. The political system needs to have
good-will among different social groups and political parties, so that in the aftermath of a
shock, there will not be problems of hostility and mistrust. Toward this end,
governments should develop the necessary instruments to ensure that adjustment is not
only efficient, but also shared in a socially acceptable manner. This highlights the
importance of social safety nets and a progressive and flexible tax system to balance
equity and efficiency.
In addition, relative price uncertainty measured by the variability of the exchange
rate has a negative effect on private investment. This suggests that countries attempting
structural change through relative-price adjustment, such as depreciations of the
exchange rate, should take into account not only the positive efficiency gains anticipated
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through the relative price-adjustments; but also the losses in private investment and the
impact on future economic growth due to the increased uncertainty. Nevertheless, using
relative prices as a tool to promote the export sector can still occur, but the structural
policies need to be taken along in order to eliminate excess volatility in price movements
in order to provide an appropriate environment for investment.
It has been seen that the external debt as well as credit rationing had an important
impact on private investment in Latin America. It will be interesting in future studies to
include these variables in the investment equation. Another extension of this project
could be to use the "propensity of executive changes" as a measure of political instability.
And finally, examine the effect of certain fiscal policies on private investment.
However, for this analysis we will need more detailed data that is not available yet.
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Table 4.1 Definition of Socio-Political Variables
-Variable Definition Explanation
ASSAS Assassinations The number of any politically motivated murder or attempted
murder of a high government official or politician.
STRIKE General strikes The number of any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service
workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed
at national government policies or authority.
WAR Guerilla warfare The number of any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings
carried on by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces
and aimed at the overthrow of the present regime.
GOV Major Government The number of any rapidly developing situation that threatens to
Crises bring the downfall of the present regime - excluding situations of
revolt aimed at such overthrow.
PUR Purges The number of any violent demonstration or clash of more than
100 citizens involving the use of ranks of the regime or the
opposition.
RIOT Riots The number of any violent demonstration or clash of more than
100 citizens involving the use of physical force.
REV Revolutions The number of any illegal or forced change in the top
governmental elite, any attempt at such a change, or any
successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is
independence from the central government.
CONS Major Constitutional The number of basic alterations in a state's constitutional
Changes structure, the extreme case being the adoption of a new
constitution that significantly alter the prerogatives of the
various branches of government. Examples of the latter might
be the sub-situation of presidential for parliamentary government
or the replacement of monarchical by republican rule.
Constitutional amendments which do not have significant impact
on the political system are not counted.
Source: Banks, A.S. 1996. Cross-National Time Series Data. Binghamton, N.Y.: SUNY Binghamton.
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Table 4.2 Summary of Principal Component1 s Anal]11ysis
Countr CI C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7
s.d. 2.37 1.87 1.63 1.13 0.93 0.86 0.47
Var 0.38 0.61 0.79 0.88 0.94 0.98 1.00
Fac 0.29 * ASSAS + 0.14 * STRIKE + 0.47 * WAR + 0.10 * GOV + 0.75 * PUR + 0.31 * RIOT
Note:
s.d. = Standard Deviation of Each Component
var = Cummulative Variance Explained
fac = Factor Loading of First Component
Table 4.3 Summarof Descri tive Statitis of the Social an Political Variables
Sum 191 155 182 131 115 244 76 28
Mean 0.60 0.48 0.57 0.41 0.36 0.76 0.24 0.09
s.d. 1.82 1.14 1.45 0.88 2.1 1.66 0.62 0.29
Note:
Sum = the sum across years
Mean = the mean across years
s.d. = the standard deviation across years
Table 4.4 Correlation between Indicators of Social Unrest
ASSAS STRIKE WAR GOV PUR RIOT REV
ASSAS 1.0000
STRIKE 0.1189 1.0000
WAR 0.2538 0.2874 1.0000
GOV 0.0857 0.1520 0.2569 1.0000
PUR 0.0568 0.0323 0.5413 0.1185 1.0000
RIOT 0.1477 0.4021 0.2339 0.2127 0.1408 1.0000
REV 0.1271 0.0722 0.1183 0.5233 0.1486 0.1957 1.0000
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Table 4.5 Correlation between Private Investment and Selected Indicators
LPFI Uncertainty SPFI
Uncertainty 
-0.27 1.00
SPFI -0.04 0.22 1.00
Table 4.6 The Political Model of Private Investment
(dependent variable log of real private investment)
Variable (1) (2)
ASSAS -0.014**
(0.005)
STRIKE -0.011
(0.016)
RIOT -0.013
(0.019)
CONS 0.08 ** 0.09 **
(0.031) (0.027)
SPI 0.007
(0.01)
D83 -0.22** 0.007
(0.043) (0.011)
S.E. 0.27 0.27
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Coefficients significant at 10 percent level.
** Coefficients significant at 5 percent level.
S.E. = standard error of regression
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Table 4.7 The Economic Model of Private Investment
(dependent variable: log of private investment)
Variable ______
Log RGD(-1) 1.38 **
(0.17)
RIR(-1) 
-4.84 E-06
(1,98E-06)
RER certainty (-1) -0.85 **
(0.26)
D83 
-0.27 **
(0.06)
S.E. 0.19
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Coefficients significant at 10 percent level.
** Coefficients significant at 5 percent level.
S.E. = standard error of regression
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Table 4.8 Soeio-Political and Economic Model
(dependent variable: log of private investment)
Variable 45
Log RGDP(-1) 1.28 ** 1.31 **
(0.159) (0.164)
RIR(-1) -3.99E-06** -3.76E-06 **
(1.63E-06) (1.50E-06)
RER uncertainty -0.62 ** -0.66 **
(0.258) (0.295)
SPI -0.05 **
(0.013)
ASSAS(-1) -0.018 **
(0.005)
STRIKE(-1) -0.02
(0.016)
RIOT(-1) -0.029 **
(0.011)
CONS(-1) 0.096 ** 0.11 **
(0.039) (0.034)
D83 -0.29 ** -0.26 **
(0.055) (0.059)
S.E. 0.18 0.19
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Coefficients significant at 10 percent level.
** Coefficients significant at 5 percent level.
S.E. = standard error of regression
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Table 4.9 Elasticities of the Socio-Political and Economic Model
(depndent variable: log of private investment)
_(4 a (a
Log RGDP(-1) 1.42 1.18
RIR(-1) -1.11 E-06 -1.05 E-06
RER uncertainty -1.28 E-04 -1.37 E-04
SPI 
-6.48 E-07
ASSAS(-1) 
-1.40 E-OS
STRIKE(-1) 
-1.24 E-05
RIOT(-1) -2.85 E-05
CONS(-1) 9.95 E-06
Table 4.10 Model of Relative Price Uncertainty
(dependent variable: relative price uncertainty)
Variable (6)
PUR 0.01 **
(0.004)
RIOT 0.002 **
(0.001)
SPI 0.001
(0.25)
AR (1) 0.87 **
(0.03)
S.E. 0.04
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Coefficients significant at 10 percent level.
** Coefficients significant at 5 percent level.
S.E. = standard error of regression.
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Table 4.10a Model of Inflation Uncertainty
(dependent variable: inflation uncertainty)
Variable (6)
PUR 
-6.40
(21.88)
RIOT 0.36
(0.16)
SPI 
-0.13*
(0.07)
AR (1) 0.49**
(0.06)
S.E. 360.4
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Coefficients significant at 10 percent level.
** Coefficients significant at 5 percent level.
S.E. = standard error of regression
Table 4.10b Real GDP Growth Uncertainty
(dependent variable: real GD growth uncertainty)
Variable (6)
PUR -0.06
(0.15)
RIOT -0.01
(0.04)
SPI 0.01
(0.05)
AR (1) 0.67 **
(0.05)
S.E. 0.90
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Coefficients significant at 10 percent level.
** Coefficients significant at 5 percent level.
S.E. = standard error of regression
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Table 4.1c Model of Real Interest Rate Uncertainty
(de endent variable: real interest rate uncertainty)
Variable (6
PUR -0.78
(3.99)
RIOT 0.001
(0.02)
SPI -0.02*
(0.008)
AR(1) 0.29**
(0.07)
S.F. 759.86
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Coefficients significant at 10 percent level.
** Coefficients significant at 5 percent level.
S.E. = standard error of regression
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